Oil Shocks and Monetary Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model for a Small Open Economy by Juan Pablo Medina & Claudio Soto
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 
 





                                                    Oil Shocks and Monetary Policy in an 
                                                 Estimated DSGE Model for a Small Open 
                                                                         Economy 
                                                               
 
 
                                                                               Juan Pablo Medina 
                                                                                    Claudio Soto 
 
                                                             
                             N.° 353 – Diciembre 2005 






CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE BANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE
La serie Documentos de Trabajo es una publicación del Banco Central de Chile que divulga
los trabajos de investigación económica realizados por profesionales de esta institución o
encargados por ella a terceros. El objetivo de la serie es aportar al debate temas relevantes y
presentar nuevos enfoques en el análisis de los mismos. La difusión de los Documentos de
Trabajo sólo intenta facilitar el intercambio de ideas y dar a conocer investigaciones, con
carácter preliminar, para su discusión y comentarios.
La publicación de los Documentos de Trabajo no está sujeta a la aprobación previa de los
miembros del Consejo del Banco Central de Chile. Tanto el contenido de los Documentos de
Trabajo como también los análisis y conclusiones que de ellos se deriven, son de exclusiva
responsabilidad de su o sus autores y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión del Banco Central
de Chile o de sus Consejeros.
The Working Papers series of the Central Bank of Chile disseminates economic research
conducted by Central Bank staff or third parties under the sponsorship of the Bank. The
purpose of the series is to contribute to the discussion of relevant issues and develop new
analytical or empirical approaches in their analyses. The only aim of the Working Papers is to
disseminate preliminary research for its discussion and comments.
Publication of Working Papers is not subject to previous approval by the members of the
Board of the Central Bank. The views and conclusions presented in the papers are exclusively
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Central Bank of Chile
or of the Board members.
Documentos de Trabajo del Banco Central de Chile
Working Papers of the Central Bank of Chile
Agustinas 1180
Teléfono: (56-2) 6702475; Fax: (56-2) 6702231Documento de Trabajo Working Paper
N° 353 N° 353
OIL SHOCKS AND MONETARY POLICY IN AN ESTIMATED
DSGE MODEL FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Juan Pablo Medina Claudio Soto
Gerencia de Investigación Económica
Banco Central de Chile
Gerencia de Investigación Económica
Banco Central de Chile
Resumen
Este paper analiza los efectos de un shock al precio del petróleo desde una perspectiva de equilibrio
general. Desarrollamos un modelo estocástico de equilibrio general dinámico (DSGE) estimado por
métodos Bayesianos para la economía Chilena. El modelo asume que el petróleo entra tanto en la
canasta de consumo de los hogares como en la función de producción de las firmas domésticas. Con
el modelo estimado, simulamos como habrían reaccionado la política monetaria y otras variables en
respuesta a un shock al precio del petróleo bajo la regla de política que describe de mejor manera el
comportamiento de la autoridad monetaria en Chile. Además, simulamos la respuesta contra factual
de las mismas variables asumiendo que los precios y salarios son flexibles, y bajo reglas de política
alternativas. Mostramos que un incremento del precio real del petróleo de 13% genera una caída en el
producto de alrededor de 0,5% y un aumento de la inflación de cerca de 0,4%. Este efecto contractivo
del shock de petróleo se debe principalmente a la respuesta endógena de la política monetaria para
controlar la inflación.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of oil-price shocks from a general equilibrium standpoint. We develop
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, estimated by Bayesian methods for the
Chilean economy. The model explicitly includes oil in the consumption basket and also in the
technology used by domestic firms. With the estimated model we simulate how monetary policy and
other variables would respond to an oil-price shock under the policy rule that best describes the
behavior of the Central Bank of Chile (CBC). We also simulate the counterfactual responses in a
flexible prices and wages equilibrium, and under alternative monetary frameworks. We show that a
13% increase in the real price of oil leads to a fall in output of about 0.5% and an increase in inflation
of about 0.4%. The contractionary effect of the oil shock is mainly due to the endogenous tightening
of the monetary policy.
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Oil prices have risen dramatically over the last few years. While by the end of 2001 the
price of WTI oil was about US$19 per barrel, in September 2005 it reached US$65. Changes
in oil prices have a direct impact on the price level of the economy, they aﬀect intra/inter-
temporal consumption decisions, and also inﬂuence the cost structure of ﬁrms —and through
this channel have a second-round eﬀect on domestic prices. Moreover, wage and price
indexation may propagate the eﬀects of oil-price shocks on inﬂation and output. In this
context, what is the impact of an oil-price shock on output? How is this eﬀect related to
the endogenous policy response of monetary policy?
To shed some light on these questions, we present an estimated dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model for the Chilean economy. The model is framed in the New
Keynesian tradition, where ﬁrms are assumed to adjust prices infrequently and wages are
set in a staggered fashion. Oil is used as an input in production and also part of the con-
sumption basket of households. We allow for a ﬂexible elasticity of substitution between oil
and other types of consumption goods in the consumption bundle, and also in the techno-
logy used by domestic ﬁrms. Key structural parameters of the model are jointly estimated
following a Bayesian approach as in Smets and Wouters (2003), Schorfheide (2000), DeJong,
Ingram, and Whiteman (2000), and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004).
In our theoretical framework, an oil-price shock generates an income eﬀe c tt h a ta ﬀects
consumption and labor decisions. It also aﬀects the marginal costs faced by domestic ﬁrms
and, through this channel, their pricing decisions. Monetary policy —modelled as a Taylor
rule— endogenously reacts to the movements in inﬂation and output caused by the oil-price
shock. The presence of oil in the total consumer price index (CPI) opens the question of
whether monetary policy should react to ﬂuctuations in total CPI inﬂation (including fuels)
or just core inﬂation.
Using the estimated model we simulate how the monetary policy instrument and other
variables would respond to an oil-price shock under the policy rule that best describes the
behavior of the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) over the last ﬁfteen years. This rule is a
Taylor-type policy reaction function, whereby the central bank adjusts the (real) interest
rate in response to deviations of core inﬂation from a target.1 We then compute the counter-
factual responses of several variables to the shock under ﬂexible prices and wages —which
corresponds to a second-best outcome—, as well as alternative monetary frameworks. In
one case, we let the monetary policy undo wage rigidities by replicating the ﬂexible wages
1At the beginning of the 1990s the Central Bank of Chile began implementing its monetary policy by
announcing yearly targets for inﬂation. In 2001 it moved to a full-ﬂedged inﬂation targeting regime with a
permanent range for inﬂation around 3%.
1equilibrium. In another case, we consider a policy that is aimed at fully stabilizing consumer
price inﬂation (CPI inﬂation). We also compute the endogenous response of the monetary
policy under a ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting regime.
Several studies have investigated the eﬀect of oil-price shocks on output for the U.S., and
the role played by the monetary policy. In general, these studies have used VAR models to
decompose the direct eﬀects of an oil-price shock on output and other variables, from those
generated by the endogenous monetary policy response (Hamilton, 1983; Bernanke, Gertler
and Watson, 1997; Hamilton and Herrera, 2004). However, lack of structural interpretation
of the reduced-form coeﬃcients of these types of model makes it very hard to disentangle
the contribution of monetary policy, and to evaluate alternative monetary policy regimes.
Using a DSGE model that explicitly includes oil allows us to better understand the
mechanisms through which oil-price shocks aﬀect inﬂation, output and the endogenous
response of monetary policy. Moreover, this methodological approach allows us to make
policy analysis overcoming the Lucas Critique.2
Using a similar approach, Leduc and Sill (2001) ﬁnd that the systematic component
of monetary policy accounts for up to two thirds of the fall in output as a consequence
of the oil shock. Our model diﬀers from theirs in two important dimensions. First, our
model introduces an additional channel throug hw h i c ha no i l - p r i c ei n c r e a s em a yd e p r e s s
the income of households. Namely, the presence of oil in the consumption basket which
exacerbates the negative impact of oil-price increases on aggregate demand. Second, rather
than being calibrated, the structural parameters in our model have been jointly estimated
with the available data for Chile.3
Our main results are the following. First, an oil-price shock has a contractionary eﬀect
on output. A 13% increase in the real price of oil (one standard deviation) leads to a fall in
output of about 0.5% and an increase in inﬂation of about 0.4%. Second, the contractionary
eﬀect of the oil shock is due mainly to the endogenous tightening of the monetary policy.
Third, a policy that counteracts wages rigidities delivers an aggregate real allocation —
i.e. aggregate employment and GDP— that is closer to the second-best outcome than the
allocation obtained under a policy rule that targets core inﬂation deviation from target.
H o w e v e r ,t h ec o s to ft h i sp o l i c yi sa ni n ﬂation response to the shock that is three times
2Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) also utilize a micro-founded general equilibrium model to analyze the
eﬀects of oil-price shocks on output. More recently, Hunt (2005) develops a version of GEM —the new DSGE
model of the IMF— to analyze whether oil-price shock could account for the stagﬂation of the 1970s in the
U.S.
3Another diﬀerence with the Leduc and Sill model is the way oil enters in the production technology.
They assume that oil consumption by ﬁrms is a function of the capital utilization rate. In our case, oil is
just another production input whose demand depends on its relative price.
2larger than under the latter policy. Fourth, a policy rule that targets CPI inﬂation delivers
an outcome that is very close to the one obtained under core inﬂation targeting. However,
if the central bank tries to fully stabilize inﬂation there will be a considerably decrease in
output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basic structure of
the model. Section 3 discusses the estimation methodology utilized. Section 4 discusses
the results obtained and compares them with other estimated models that utilize a similar
methodology. Section 5 presents some impulse-response functions to an oil-price shock.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we describe a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
nominal and real rigidities. The model is a micro-founded model closely related to the New
Open Economy models. It is a simpliﬁed version of the model developed by Medina and
Soto (2005) for the Chilean economy.
The domestic economy is open and it is small for the rest of the world. The latter as-
sumption implies that international prices, the foreign interest rate and foreign demand are
not aﬀected by domestic agents’ decisions. Prices and wages are sticky. They are optimally
adjusted infrequently, and they are partially indexed to past inﬂation. The introduction of
wage rigidities together with price rigidities is very important in our model not only because
it increases the realisms of the model but because it implies a stronger trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations (see Erceg et al., 2000, and Blanchard and Galí, 2005).4
Domestic households consume domestically-produced goods (Home goods), imported
diﬀerentiated goods (Foreign goods), and fuel (oil). All three diﬀerent types of goods are
imperfect substitutes in the consumption basket. We assume that consumption exhibits
habit formation. Home goods are partly sold domestically and partly exported abroad.
There is also a commodity good whose endowment is exogenously determined that is ex-
ported and not consumed domestically. The exogenous endowment of this good is subjected
to stochastic shocks.
Households supply a diﬀerentiated labor service and receive the corresponding wage
compensations. Each household has a monopolistic power over the type of labor service
it provides. Furthermore, households are the owners of ﬁrms producing Home goods, and
4Blanchard and Galí emphasize that price rigidities alone does not imply a conﬂict between output gap
and inﬂation stabilization —what they call the divine coincidence. They show that adding wage rigidities
breaks down this divine coincidence.
3therefore, they receive the income corresponding to the monopolistic rents generated by
these ﬁrms.
Domestic ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated varieties of Home goods. For simplicity, we assume
that labor and Oil are the only variable inputs used for production. These ﬁrms have
monopolistic power over the variety of goods they produce. We assume that productivity
is subjected to stochastic shocks and grows at a rate gy in steady state.
Monetary policy is modelled as a Taylor-type rule that incorporates interest rate inertia.
In particular, the interest rate reacts to inﬂation, GDP growth and its own lagged value.
Finally, we also assume that in the steady state, the inﬂation rate is exogenously determined
by the monetary authority (the inﬂation target).
2.1 Households
The domestic economy is inhabited by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0,1].



















where lt (j) is labor eﬀort, Ct (j) is total consumption, and Mt (j) stands for total nominal
balances held at the beginning of period t. Parameter σL is the inverse elasticity of labor
supply with respect to real wages. ζt is a preference shock that shifts the labor supply. Pref-
erences display habit formation in consumption governed by parameter h. The consumption















where OC,t represents fuel (Oil) consumption, and Zt is a bundle of non-fuel consumption














where CH represents a bundle of domestically produced goods (Home goods), and CF
corresponds to a bundle of imported goods (Foreign goods).
Parameter η is the elasticity of substitution between Oil and core consumption, and
parameter θ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods.
For any level of consumption, each household purchases a composite of Home and Foreign
goods and Oil in order to minimize the total cost of its consumption basket. Hence, each
household minimizes PO,tOC,t(j)+PZ,tZt(j), subject to (2), where PO,t and PZ,t are the
4price of Oil and the core consumption deﬂator, respectively. The demand for Oil and core
consumption are given by











Analogously, each household determines the optimal composition of core consumption
by minimizing the cost of the core consumption basket, PH,tCH,t(j)+PF,tCF,t(j),s u b j e c t












The consumption-based price index (CPI), Pt, and the core consumption price index,









1−η and PZ,t =
h
γP1−θ




Domestic households have access to three diﬀerent types of assets: money Mt (j),o n e -
period non-contingent foreign bonds B∗
t (j), and one-period domestic contingent bonds
Dt+1(j) w h i c hp a yo u to n eu n i to fd o m e s t i cc u r r e ncy in a particular state. There are
no adjustment costs in the portfolio composition. However, each time a domestic house-
hold borrows from abroad it must pay a premium over the international price of external













t−1(j)+Mt−1(j)+Wt(j)lt (j)+Πt (j)+Tt (j) − PtCt(j), (7)
where i∗
t is the return on the international bond in the international market, Πt (j) are
proﬁts received from domestic ﬁrms, Et is the nominal exchange rate, Wt (j) is the nominal









corresponds to the premium domestic households have to pay each




t (j)dj is the aggregate net foreign asset
position of the economy and PX,tXt is the nominal value of exports.6 Variable Qt,t+1 is the
5See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for diﬀerent ways to get steady state independent of initial condi-
tions for small open economy models.
6Since the economy is growing in steady state, the net asset position is also growing in the long run.
Therefore, in order to have a stationary risk premium it is necessary that this premium be a function of
the ratio of the net asset position to some variable that grows at the same rate in steady state. We choose
export since that could represent a form of international collateral (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001).
5period t price of domestic contingent bonds normalized by the probability of occurrence of
the state. Assuming the existence of a full set of contingent bonds ensures that consumption
of all households is the same, independently of the labor income they receive each period.
Since the premium depends on the aggregate net foreign asset position of the economy,
households take Θ(·) as given when deciding their optimal portfolios. In other words,
households do not internalize the eﬀect on the premium of changes in their own foreign




















Here B∗ corresponds to the steady state net foreign asset position, while PXX is the
steady state value of exports. When the country as a whole is a net debtor,   corresponds
to the elasticity of the upward slopping supply of international funds.
2.1.1 Consumption and saving decisions
Households choose consumption and the composition of their portfolios by maximizing (1)
subject to (7). Since we are assuming the existence of a complete set of contingent claims,
consumption is equalized across households. Therefore, in what follows we omit index j
from consumption.
Aggregating the ﬁrst order conditions on diﬀerent contingent claims over all possible
states we obtain the following Euler equation:
Et
∙




Ct − h(1 + gy)Ct−1
Ct+1 − h(1 + gy)Ct
¶¸
=1 , (8)
where in equilibrium it must be true that 1+it =1 /Et[Qt,t+1].









Ct − h(1 + gy)Ct−1
Ct+1 − h(1 + gy)Ct
¶¸
=1 . (9)
Combining the two expressions above we obtain an expression for the uncovered interest
parity condition (UIP).
2.1.2 Labor supply decisions and wage setting
Each household j is a monopolistic supplier of a diﬀerentiated labor service. There is a set
of perfectly competitive labor service assemblers that hire labor from each household and
6combine it into an aggregate labor service unit, lt, that is then used by the intermediate










The optimal composition of this labor service unit is obtained by minimizing its cost,
given the diﬀerent wages set by diﬀerent households. In particular, the demand for the
















Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that wage setting is subject to a nominal
rigidity à la Calvo (1983). In each period, each type of household faces a constant probability
(1−φL) of being able to re-optimize its nominal wage. We assume there is an updating rule
for all those households that cannot re-optimize their wages. In particular, if a household










(1 + πt+j−1)ξL(1 + πt+j)1−ξL (1 + gy).
This “passive” adjustment rule implies that workers who do not optimally reset their
wages update them by considering a geometric weighted average of past CPI inﬂation and
the inﬂation target set by the authority, πt. The term (1+gy) is included in the expression
above in order to avoid large real wage dispersion along the steady state growth path. Once
a household has decided on a wage, it must supply any quantity of labor service that is
demanded at that wage.




















7subject to the labor demand (11) and the updating rule for the nominal wage (13). The
variable Λt,t+i is the relevant discount factor between periods t and t + i,a n di sg i v e nb y
Λt,t+i = βi Ct−(1+gy)hCt−1
Ct+i−(1+gy)hCt+i−1.
2.2 Domestic production
Production in the Home goods sector is characterized by ﬁrms that act as a monopoly in
the production of a single variety. Each ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts by choosing the price of its














where YH,t (zH) represents the quantity of a particular variety zH, LH,t(zH) is the labor
input utilized, and OH,t (zH) is Oil used in production of that variety.
Variable AH,t represents a productivity shock in the Home goods sector that is common
to all ﬁrms. Parameter ω deﬁnes the elasticity of substitution between Labor and Oil in
production. The value of this parameter is key to determine the eﬀects of oil-price shocks
in output and also their eﬀects on the marginal cost and core inﬂation.
2.2.1 Demand for inputs and marginal cost
Firms determine the optimal mix of inputs by minimizing total costs of production, subject






















Notice that the nominal marginal cost depends only on the prices of inputs and the
technology level, which is common for all ﬁrms. Therefore, the marginal cost is independent
from the scale of production of a particular ﬁrm.
2.2.2 Price setting
Following Calvo (1983) we assume that only a fraction φH of the producers can reset their
prices each period. We assume that a ﬁrm that does not receive the signal to adjust
optimally its price follows a simple “passive” rule to update the price. In particular, if the
8ﬁrm does not adjust its price between t and t+i, then the price it charges in t+i is given by
Γi
H,tPH,t(zH),w h e r eΓi
H,t is a function that deﬁnes the updating rule. If the ﬁrm receives



























where  H is the price elasticity of the demand for variety zH.7 This parameter also deﬁnes
the ﬂexible price equilibrium markup charged by ﬁrms producing Home goods.
The “passive” adjustment rule for those ﬁrms that do not receive a signal between t and






ξH (1 + πt+j)
1−ξH , (17)
where 1+πH,t =( PH,t/PH,t−1), and where πt+j corresponds to the inﬂation target set by
the authority. Notice that relative price changes may have a feedback impact through this
adjustment rule. Firms that do not optimally adjust take into consideration the inﬂation
target that is set in terms of consumer goods inﬂation. The parameter ξH captures the
degree of “indexation” in the economy. The larger this parameter, the larger the weight of
past inﬂa t i o ni nd e ﬁning new prices.
Given the price charged by a ﬁrm producing variety zH,i t sp r o ﬁts are given by:
Πt (zH)=PH,t(zH)YH,t (zH) − WtLH,t(zH) − PO,tOH,t(zH).
2.3 Foreign sector
We assume the economy exports two types of goods: Home goods and an exportable com-
modity YS,t whose endowment is determined exogenously. For simplicity, we assume that











7This demand for a particular variety zH comes from the assumption that the Home consumption good








8In Chile, a signiﬁcant fraction of total exports is made up of commodities based on natural resources.
These commodities are produced somehow independently of the domestic economic conditions (e.g., interest
rate, real wages) and therefore, they can be considered as exogenous in the short run.











where γ∗ corresponds to the share of domestic intermediate goods in the consumption basket
of foreign agents and η∗ is the price elasticity of demand. We assume that domestic ﬁrms
cannot price discriminate across markets. Therefore, the law of one price holds for Home
goods sold abroad, P∗
H,t = PH,t/Et.
The real exchange rate is deﬁned as the relative price of the foreign consumption basket,
P∗






Notice that we are assuming that the price of Foreign goods is the relevant international
price to be used when constructing the real exchange rate. In other words, we are implicitly
assuming that the consumption bundle abroad does not include Oil and that the share of
Home goods in this bundle, γ∗, is negligible.










O,t is the foreign currency price of Oil abroad. Variable ψt in equation (21) corres-
ponds to deviations from the law of one price in the oil price. Empirical evidence shows
that the pass-through from the international oil price to its price in domestic currency is
not complete in the short run.9 Both P∗
O,t/P∗
F,t and ψt are assumed to follow a log-linear
autoregressive process of order one.
2.4 Aggregate equilibrium
For simplicity we assume that there is no public spending. Therefore, the government
budget constraint is simply given by
Z




Tt (j)dj =0 . (22)
The equilibrium in both the Home goods sector and the labor market implies:
YH,t = CH,t + C∗
H,t lt = LH,t. (23)
9I nt h ec a s eo fC h i l et h e s ed e v i a t i o n sf r o mt h el a wo f one price could be explained by the operation of
the Oil Stabilization Fund (“FEP”).
10Combining these equilibrium conditions, the budget constraint of the government and
the aggregate budget constraint of households, we obtain an expression for the aggregate








































respectively, where Ot = ON,t + OC,t stands for total oil imports.
Let PY,t denote the implicit output deﬂator. Then, total GDP —at current prices—
satisﬁes the following relation:
PY,t
Pt







2.5 Monetary policy rules
The monetary policy is characterized as a simple feedback rule for the real interest rate.
Under the baseline speciﬁcation of the model, we assume that the central bank responds to
















where πt is the inﬂation target set for period t and rt =( 1+it)/Et (Pt+1/Pt)−1 is the net
real interest rate. Variable νt is a monetary policy shock that corresponds to a deviation
from the policy rule.
We deﬁne a rule in terms of the real interest rate to be consistent with the common
practice of the CBC during most part of the sample period utilized to estimate the model.10
We also consider an alternative speciﬁcation for the policy rule where we assume that
the central bank responds to deviations of core rather than CPI inﬂation from target, where
core inﬂation is deﬁned as πZ,t =
PZ,t
PZ,t−1 − 1.
10From 1985 to July 2001 the CBC utilized an index interest rate as its policy instrument. This indexed
interest rate corresponds roughly to an ex-ante real interest rate (Fuentes et al., 2003).
113M o d e l E s t i m a t i o n
3.1 Empirical methodology
The model is estimated by using a Bayesian approach (see DeJong, Ingram, and Whiteman,
2000; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2005).11
The Bayesian approach is a system-based methodology that ﬁts the DSGE model to a
vector of time series. The estimation is based on the likelihood function generated by the
solution of the log-linear version of the model. Prior distributions are used to incorporate
additional information into the parameters’ estimation.
Appendix A presents the log-linearized version of the model developed in the previous
section. Equations (A1) through (A32) form a linear rational expectation system that can
be written in canonical form as
Ω0 (ϑ)zt = Ω1 (ϑ)zt−1 + Ω2 (ϑ)εt + Ω3 (ϑ)ξt
where zt = {b ct, b cF,t, b cH,t, b it, b rt, b πt, b πZ,t, ∆b et, b b∗
t, c rert, b prH,t, b prO,t, b πH,t, c wrt, d mrst, b lt, b ot,
b oC,t, b oH,t, b yt, b yH,t, b xt, b mt, b aH,t, b ζt, b c∗
t, b pr∗
O,t, b ψt, b i∗
t, b π∗
t, b yS,t,ν t} is a vector containing the
model’s variables expressed as log-deviations from their steady-state values, εt = {εa,t,ε i∗,t,
εc∗,t,ε π∗,t,ε ζ,t,ε ψ,t,ε o,t,ε S,t, εb ν,t} is a vector containing white noise innovations to the
structural shocks of the model, and ξt is a vector containing rational expectation forecast
errors. Matrices Ωi are non-linear functions of the structural parameters contained in vector
ϑ. The solution to this system can be expressed as follows
zt = Ωz (ϑ)zt−1 + Ωε (ϑ)εt (28)
where Ωz and Ωε are functions of the structural parameters.
Let yt be a vector of observable variables. This vector is related to the variables in the
model through a measurement equation:
yt = Hzt (29)
where H is a matrix that selects elements from zt. In our case we assume that the vector
of observable variables is given by yt = {b yt, b πZ,t, b rt, ∆b et, c rert, c wrt, b lt, b ot, b pr∗
O,t}.T h er e s t
of the variables are assumed to be non-observable.
Equations (28) and (29) correspond to the state-space form representation of yt.I f
we assume that the white noise innovations are normally distributed, we can compute the
11Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2004) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) discuss in depth the
advantages of this approach to estimate DSGE models.
12conditional likelihood function for the structural parameters using the Kalman ﬁlter, L(ϑ |
YT),w h e r eYT = {y1,...,yT}.L e tp(ϑ) be a prior density on the structural parameters.
We can use data on the observable variables YT to update the priors through the likelihood





L(ϑ |Y T)p(ϑ) R
L(ϑ |Y T)p(ϑ)dϑ
(30)
An approximated solution for the posterior distribution is computed by using the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm (see Appendix B).
One of the advantages of the Bayesian approach is that it can cope with potential
model misspeciﬁcation and possible lack of identiﬁcation of the parameters of interest. For
example, if in a misspeciﬁed model the likelihood function peaks at a value that is at
odds with the prior information of any given parameter, the posterior probability will be
low. Therefore, the prior density allows to weight information about diﬀerent parameters
according to its reliability. On the other hand, lack of identiﬁcation may lead to a likelihood
function that is ﬂat for some parameter values. Hence, based on the likelihood function
alone, it may not be possible to identify some parameters of interest. In this case, a proper
prior can introduce curvature into the objective function, the posterior distribution, making
it possible to identify the values of diﬀerent parameters (Lubik and Shorfheide, 2005).
The parameter vector to be estimated is ϑ =( σL,h ,θ ,η ,η ∗,  ,φ H,φ L,ξ H,ξ L,ρ i,  π,
 y,ρ a,ρ ζ,ρ c∗,ρ ψ,ρ i∗,ρ π∗,ρ s,σ a,σ ζ,σ c∗,σ ψ,σ i∗,σ π∗,σ s,σ ν). Parameters ρo and σo are
estimated outside the model using data on oil prices. Parameter ρν is assumed to be zero.
All other parameters of the model are chosen so as to match the steady state of the model
with some long-run trend data in the Chilean economy.
In particular, we assume an annual long run labor productivity growth, gy,o f3.5%.12
The long-run annual inﬂation rate is set at 3%, which is consistent with the midpoint target
value for CPI inﬂation deﬁned by the CBC in 1999. The subjective discount factor, β,i s
set at 0.99 (annual basis) in order to get an annual nominal interest rate of 7.5%i nt h e
steady state.
The share of imported goods in the consumption basket, γ,i ss e ta t40%, while the share
of Home goods in total GDP,
CH+C∗
H
Y ,i ss e ta t80%.13 The net export to GDP ratio, X−M
Y ,
equals 0.5% in steady state, which is consistent with its average value in the sample period
analyzed. The remaining shares can be obtained by using these values and the steady state
relationships (see Appendix A). We do not have information on price and wage markups.
12This is consistent with 5% long run GDP growth and 1.5% of labor force growth.
13Natural Resources accounts for 20% of total GDP. In our case that correspond to output of good S.
13Therefore, we use values consistent with those utilized by other studies. In particular, we
set  L =  H =9 .14
We take the steady-state share of oil in the consumption basket, OC
C , to be 0.04. This
ﬁgure is consistent with the share of fuels in the representative consumption basket utilized
to compute the CPI. To compute the steady-state share of oil in the production of Home
goods OH
YH we utilize the ﬁgures for the total oil imports ratio to GDP, OC+OH
Y ,w h i c hi s
around 0.05, and then subtract the share of fuel consumption by households. Finally, the
estimation of the autoregressive process for the real price of oil implies that ρo =0 .88 and
σo =1 3 .4%.
3.2 Data
To estimate the model we use Chilean quarterly data for the period from 1990Q1 to 2005Q1.
We choose the following seven observable variables: real GDP, short-run real interest rate,
a measure of core inﬂation computed by the Central Bank of Chile (“IPCX1”), the real
exchange rate, nominal exchange rate devaluation, real wages and labor input. We also
utilize series on oil imports and the real price of oil (international price of WTI oil deﬂated
by an index of relevant external prices for the Chilean economy).
In order to work with stationary series we demean all variables. In the case of real
wages and GDP we de-trend and demean the series using a linear trend. Labor input
is constructed as the fraction of total employment over the working-age population. The
short-run real interest rate correspond to the monetary policy rate. This was an indexed
rate from the beginning of the sample until July 2001. After July 2001 the monetary policy
has been conducted by using a nominal interest rate. Therefore, for the latter period we
construct a series for the real interest rate computing the diﬀerence between the nominal
monetary policy rate and the expected inﬂation implicit in the main forecast model of the
C e n t r a lB a n ko fC h i l e .
3.3 Prior distributions
Priors’ density functions reﬂect our beliefs about parameter values. Setting a relatively
high standard deviation for a density function implies that our prior for the corresponding
parameter is more diﬀuse. In general, we choose priors based on evidence from previous
studies for Chile. When the evidence is weak or nonexistent, we impose more diﬀuse priors.
14Christiano et al. (2005) use  L =2 1and  H =6for a closed economy model calibrated for US. Adolfson
et al. (2005a) use the same values for an open economy model calibrated for the euro area. Brubakk et al.
(2005) use  L =5 .5 and  H =6for a calibrated model of the Norwegian economy. Jacquinot et al. (2005)
calibrate  L =2 .65 and  H =1 1for a model of the euro area.
14Table 1 depicts the prior distribution for each parameter contained in ϑ,i t sm e a na n d
the 90% probability interval. For the inverse elasticity of labor supply, σL,w ea s s u m ea n
i n v e r s eg a m m ad i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hm o d e1 . 0a n dt hree degrees of freedom. This implies that
the elasticity of labor supply, σ−1
L , can take values between 0.2 and 1.6 in the 90% conﬁdence
interval. This is a wide range. It reﬂects our uncertainty with respect to this coeﬃcient.
The habit formation coeﬃcient, h, has a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.25. As a result, the 90% conﬁdence interval for this coeﬃcient is between 0.1
and 0.9. This range is much wider than the one considered by Adolfson et al. (2005a) for
t h es a m ec o e ﬃcient in the euro area, reﬂecting again our uncertainty on the value for this
parameter.
The probabilities that prices and wages are not reset optimally every quarter, φH and
φL, respectively, are assumed to follow a beta distribution with mean 0.75 and a standard
deviation of 0.05. These are similar priors to the ones considered by Adolfson et al. (2005a)
for the euro area and by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005) for the US. The elasticity of
substitution between foreign and domestic goods, θ, follows an inverse gamma distribution
with mode 1.0 and three degrees of freedom. The same prior is assumed for η∗.I n t h i s
case, this elasticity can vary between 0.64 and 4.89. This wide range is in line with the one
suggested by Adolfson et al. (2005a). The elasticity of the international supply of funds,
 , is assumed to follow an inverse gamma distribution with mode 0.1 and four degrees of
freedom.
As in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005), we do not impose non-negativity restrictions
on the policy rule coeﬃcients. In particular, we assume normal distributions for  π and
 y.F o r π we set a mean of 0.75 with a standard deviation of 0.15. For  y, we set a mean
of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.15. As a result, the prior 90% probability interval for
this coeﬃcient goes from 0.25 to 0.75. Finally, for the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient,
ρi, we assume a beta distribution with mean 0.75 and a standard deviation of 0.2. These
priors are in line with the estimated policy-rule coeﬃcients in previous studies for Chile.15
Following other studies, we assume a low degree of substitution of Oil in the consumption
basket and also in the production function.16 In particular, our priors are such that η and
ω have inverse gamma distributions with mode 0.2 and four degrees of freedom. These
distributions imply that a 90% interval for these elasticities is between 0.13 and 0.73.
The autoregressive parameters of the stochastic shocks, ρζ, ρi∗, ρπ∗, ρS, ρc∗, ρψ, ρa have
beta distributions. This means that their value should lie in the (0,1) interval range. We
15See Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002) and Caputo (2005).
16See e.g. Backus and Crucini (2000) and Frondel and Schmidt (2002) for a review of the estimates of the
elasticity of energy or Oil with other inputs.
15do not impose tight priors on these distributions, so shocks can be either persistent or non-
persistent. In particular, for all parameters we set the prior mean at 0.7 and the standard
deviation at 0.25. In this way the 90% probability interval considers values that go from
0.21 to 0.99. The variances of the shocks are assumed to be distributed as an inverse gamma
distribution with two degrees of freedom. The shape of this distribution implies a rather
diﬀuse prior, i.e., we do not have strong prior information on those coeﬃcients. In any case,
the means of the distributions are set based on previous single equation estimations and
on trials with weak priors. In particular, σa, σc∗, σS, σψ and σζ have a prior mode of 1.0,
which implies values for these parameters between 0.63 and 8.44. For σi∗ the mode is set
at 0.5 implying values that go from 0.31 to 4.22, whereas for σπ∗ and σm t h em o d ei ss e t
at 0.25 and 0.20, respectively.
4R e s u l t s
Once priors have been speciﬁe d ,w ee s t i m a t et h em o d e lb yﬁrst computing the posterior
mode, and then constructing the posterior distribution with the Metropolis-Hastings al-
gorithm. In table 2, we present the posterior mean of each parameter and its standard
deviation under two alternative speciﬁcations for the monetary policy rule. One speciﬁca-
tion considers a rule that reacts to current CPI inﬂation. The other speciﬁcation has a rule
that targets core inﬂation. In order to compare these two diﬀerent models, we also report
the value of the log marginal likelihood.17
For the ﬁrst model speciﬁcation, the elasticity of labor supply, σ−1
L , is estimated at
0.78, which is smaller than the values estimated for the US by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez
(2005). On the other hand, the estimated habit formation coeﬃcient, h,i s0.32.T h i s
is coherent with an autoregressive coeﬃcient for consumption —h/(1 + h)—o fn e a r l y0.24,
which is smaller than the one found for Europe by Adolfson et al. (2005a) and Caputo et
al. (2005) for the Chilean economy. This could be explained by the explicit inclusion of Oil
in the consumption basket. Since we estimate an elasticity of substitution between Oil and
core consumption of less than one, the persistence of oil shocks by itself will also generate
more persistence in aggregate consumption, without having to rely on habit formation.
The estimated elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods in the con-
sumption basket of domestic households, θ,i s0.6. In turn, the estimated value for demand
elasticity of Home goods abroad, η∗, is 1.1. These values are somehow below the corres-
17As pointed out by Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2004) and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez
(2005), the marginal likelihood can be used to compare models. An advantage of using the marginal likelihood
is that it penalizes over-parametrization.
16ponding ones estimated for the euro area by Adolfson et al. (2005a).
The estimated Calvo probabilities of not resetting optimally prices and wages, φH and
φL,a r e0.17 and 0.82, respectively. These ﬁgures imply that prices are set optimally more
frequently than wages. In particular, prices are reset optimally every 1.2 quarters whereas
wages are re-optimized, on average, every 5 to 6 quarters. The result for φH is in sharp
contrast with the evidence for developed economies. Adolfson et al. (2005) estimations
for the euro area ﬁnd values for φH and φL of 0.895 and 0.710 respectively. These values
imply average duration between re-optimization of prices and wages of 9.5 and 3.5 quarters,
respectively. On the other hand, Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005) ﬁnd that for the US,
the average duration between re-optimization of prices and wages is 6.2 and 2.4 quarters. In
a partial equilibrium estimation for Chile, Céspedes et al. (2005) ﬁnd more prices stickiness
than we do. In particular, they ﬁnd that prices are re-optimized every 3 to 8 quarters.
However, in their estimations they do not consider the cross-equation restrictions imposed
by a full information approach as in this paper. Consistently with our results, Caputo et
al. (2005) estimate that re-optimization of prices and wages in Chile take places every 1.3
and 7 quarters, respectively.18
Our results show a high degree of wage indexation. In particular, the coeﬃcient ξL is
estimated to be 0.91. In contrast, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcative evidence of price indexation
(ξH =0 .26). This latter result implies a reduced-form coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
Home goods Phillips curve,
ξH
1+βξH,c l o s et o0.2. Our estimated values for ξL and ξH are
consistent with the ones found by Levin et al. (2005) for the US economy. In particular, they
estimate that the indexation of wages is about 0.8 whereas the corresponding parameter
for prices is below 0.2. For Chile, Céspedes et al. (2005) ﬁnd a much larger value for
ξH. However, they do not consider wage indexation. Therefore, it seems that once wage
indexation is introduced, price inﬂation inertia by itself tends to be less important to ﬁtt h e
aggregate data.
The results for the policy rule coeﬃcients, ρi,  π and  y tend to conﬁrm the ﬁndings of
previous research. First there is a degree of interest rate smoothing. However, the posterior
mean of ρi is slightly smaller than previous estimates for Chile. Second, the response of
the interest rate to inﬂation deviation from target is relatively more important than the
response to output growth deviation from trend. In particular,  π is estimated to be 0.85,
whereas  y is 0.12.
The estimated value of the elasticity of substitution between oil and core consumption,
η, is higher that the one between labor and oil in production, ω.I np a r t i c u l a r ,η is estimated
18It is important to mention that Caputo et al. (2005) use the same methodology as in this paper and a
similar data set.
17to be around 0.66,w h e r e a sω is 0.51. These values lie in the upper range of the support of
the corresponding prior distributions.
If we compare this estimation with the one presented by Caputo et al. (2005) for a model
of Chilean economy that excludes the eﬀects of Oil, we see that the estimated rigidities are
smaller when Oil is included. The persistence of the oil price shock (ρo = 0.88) introduces
inertia through its eﬀect on core consumption and marginal costs. Hence, the estimated
magnitude of rigidities has to be smaller in order to explain the dynamics of the aggregate
data.
The estimated posterior mean of several structural parameters does not change signiﬁc-
antly when the model includes a monetary policy rule that targets core inﬂation. Exceptions
are the coeﬃcients in the monetary policy rule. Although the coeﬃcient that captures the
reaction of the interest rate to core inﬂation is similar to the one found in the previous case,
the rule features less persistency and almost no reaction to GDP growth. The posterior
mean of the elasticity of substitution of oil in the consumption basket under this speciﬁca-
tion is smaller than the one in the production function. Nevertheless, the estimated values
of both parameters are quite similar to the previous case.
The apparent similarity between both speciﬁcation disappears when one looks at the
log marginal likelihood (last row in table 2). This statistic highlights that a model with a
monetary rule that targets core inﬂation makes a better account of the Chilean data vis-à-
vis am o d e lw i t hap o l i c yr u l et h a tt a r g e t sC P Ii n ﬂation. This result does not imply that
monetary policy in Chile has not reacted to oil-price shocks. What it does show is that
monetary policy has not responded to the direct inﬂationary consequences of oil-price shocks
on CPI inﬂation. Rather, monetary policy has reacted to the increases in costs associated to
these shocks and, consequently, to their eﬀects on core inﬂation. In other words, monetary
policy has been more concerned with the “second-round” eﬀects of oil-price shocks.
5E ﬀects of an Oil-Price Shock
In this section we discuss the eﬀects of an oil shock —an increase in the real price of oil—
on diﬀerent domestic variables. We present some impulse-response functions generated
under the preferred model and we compare the outcome with the one that would have been
obtained under diﬀerent policy rules, and under ﬂexible wages and prices. As discussed in
the previous section, the model that better ﬁts the Chilean data over the last ﬁfteen years
is a model where the monetary policy targets core rather than CPI inﬂation. Therefore, the
baseline policy rule for the impulse-response analysis corresponds to that rule. To compute
the impulse-response functions we use the posterior mean of the structural parameters
18presented in table 2.
Figure 1 shows the responses of the main aggregate variables to an unanticipated increase
of the real price of oil of 13% (one standard deviation) under the estimated baseline policy
rule. Given that a fraction of households’ expenditure is devoted to oil consumption —and
since the economy is a net oil importer— the rise in the oil price implies a negative income
eﬀect that contracts domestic consumption. As a consequence, the demand for all three
types of goods in the consumption basket falls. There is also a substitution eﬀect that tends
to increase the demand for both Home and Foreign goods. However, since the degree of
substitution between oil and the other types of goods is low, this eﬀect does not counteract
t h en e g a t i v ei n c o m ee ﬀect on the demand for Home goods. Moreover, the shock also pushes
up the cost of ﬁrms producing these types of goods, and their prices relative to the prices of
Foreign goods increases. Therefore, there is an additional expenditure-switching mechanism
that lowers even further the demand for Home goods.
T h en e g a t i v ei n c o m ee ﬀect of the shock and the consequent contraction in consumption
induces an expansion in labor supply. However, there is also a contraction in labor demand
by ﬁrms producing Home goods. Those ﬁrms tend to hire more labor to substitute for the
more expensive oil. However, the elasticity of substitution between those two inputs is low.
Moreover, the decrease in the demand for Home goods dominates this substitution eﬀect
and the resulting labor demand falls. Thus, total employment falls by approximately 0.8%
during the ﬁrst year after the shock. Total GDP, in turn, falls by a slightly smaller amount.
Real wages fall by 0.4% on impact and then slowly converge to their steady-state level.
T h ep a t ho fc o r ei n ﬂation is moderately stabilized by the monetary policy. core inﬂation
drops slightly on impact (due to a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate) and then
increases up to 0.2% above its target level in the second quarter after the shock. This
deviation above target of core inﬂation disappears slowly over time. Total inﬂation deviates
almost 0.5% above the target initially which is mainly explained by the direct incidence
of the oil price in the CPI. However, the subsequent deviations are related to deviations
of core inﬂation from target. The observed real appreciation of 1% is consistent with the
sharp increase in the CPI after the shock. The real interest rate increases signiﬁcantly (50
basis points) in the second quarter after the oil price shock, and slowly returns to its neutral
level.
Since the monetary policy reacts by increasing the real interest rate, it is not clear if the
contractive consequence of the oil price shock are due the shock itself or just the consequence
of the endogenous response of the policy. To shed some light on the degree of stabilization
that monetary policy can achieve, we analyze how the economy would have responded after
the same oil price shock under alternative monetary regimes.
19As a ﬁrst benchmark case, ﬁgure 2 shows the eﬀects of an increase in the oil price
under ﬂexible prices and wages. Given that the only two nominal rigidities in our model
are those of prices and wages, this ﬂexible wages and prices case corresponds to the second
best equilibrium outcome.19 In this case, there is a slightly increase in GDP in response
to the shock, which is explained by the increase in employment. When wages are ﬂexible,
the negative eﬀect of the oil price shock on households’ income leads to an expansion in
labor supply that generates a signiﬁcative reduction in real wages. This contrasts with the
baseline case, when the two nominal rigidities are present, where the fall in the real wage
is lower and also less persistent. This fall in the real wages induces a stronger substitution
eﬀect in production, that results in a small expansion of employment.
It is important to notice that in our model this second-best outcome is not feasible under
both price and wage rigidities. In other words, it is not possible for monetary policy alone to
replicate the allocation that would be obtained under ﬂexible wages and prices (see Erceg,
Henderson and Levin 2000; Blanchard and Galí, 2005). Moreover, given that wages are
sticky, and given the presence of wage indexation, if the monetary policy tries to replicate
the ﬂexible price (not ﬂexible wages) allocation, the system becomes undetermined.
For that reason, as a second benchmark case we compare the responses to the oil price
shock when the monetary policy follows a contingent rule that undoes the nominal wage
rigidity. Figure 3 depicts the impulse-response functions under this alternative rule. Like
i nt h ec a s ew i t hﬂexible wages and prices, the negative response of real wages implies a less
severe contraction in labor demand which reduces the contractionary eﬀect of the oil price
shock on output. In presence of wages rigidities, this fall in the real wage is achieved by
means of an unanticipated increase in total inﬂation. Therefore, this alternative policy rule
conveys a lower monetary contraction than under the baseline case. However, this policy
also generates a response of both CPI and core inﬂation that is three times larger than under
the baseline policy rule. In other words, this policy achieves a signiﬁcative stabilization of
output —which is much closer to the second best outcome—, but at the cost of more and
more persistent deviation of inﬂa t i o nf r o mt a r g e t . M o r e o v e r ,w h e nt h ec r e d i b i l i t yo ft h e
central bank in controlling the inﬂation depends on its observed deviation from target, this
policy may lead to a lose in the reputation of the monetary authority.
Figure 4 shows the responses under a rule that targets CPI inﬂation. For this case, we
use the same coeﬃcients of the rule under the preferred model, but we replace core inﬂation
by CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h es p e c i ﬁcation. This policy is more contractionary after the oil price
shock, generating in the short run a higher contraction in GDP. In contrast, CPI inﬂation
19The ﬁrst best outcome is a allocation that also undoes the distortions generated by the monopoly power
of workers and ﬁrms.
20deviates by less form its targets, but core inﬂation becomes more volatile. Since inﬂation
jumps up by less under this policy, real wages fall also by less than in the preferred model.
As a consequence, employment and GDP fall more under this policy. In summary, the
relative success of reducing the increase in CPI nﬂa t i o ni nt h es h o r tr u nc o n t r a s t sw i t ha
more signiﬁcative deviation of core inﬂation, GDP and employment with respect its steady
state values. The negative consequence of stabilizing CPI inﬂation can be seen more clearly
in the case of policy that follows a strict CPI inﬂation targeting. The responses of the
aggregate variables after the same oil price shock under this monetary arrangement are
shown in ﬁgure 5. In this case, monetary policy is much more contractionary. Employment
falls more than 1% whereas the higher increase in interest rate implies a bigger appreciation.
The full stabilization of inﬂation is achieved through a fall in core inﬂation on impact, which
is a direct consequence of the nominal exchange rate appreciation.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we present an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
for the Chilean economy. The model is framed in the New Keynesian tradition, where ﬁrms
are assumed to adjust prices infrequently and wages are set in a staggered fashion. Oil is
used as an input in production and it is also part of the consumption basket of households.
We allow for a ﬂexible elasticity of substitution between oil and other types of consumption
goods in the consumption bundle, and also in the technology utilized by domestic ﬁrms. Key
structural parameters of the model are jointly estimated following a Bayesian approach as
in Smets and Wouters (2003), Schorfheide (2000), DeJong, Ingram, and Whiteman (2000),
and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004).
Using the estimated model we simulate how the monetary policy would respond to an
oil shock under the policy rule that best describes the behavior of the Central Bank of Chile
(CBC) over the last ﬁfteen years. This rule is a Taylor type policy reaction function for the
real interest, where the central bank responds to deviation of core inﬂation from target. We
then compute the counter-factual policy response under alternative monetary frameworks.
In one case, we let the monetary policy to undo wages rigidities by replicating the ﬂexible
wages equilibrium. In another case, we consider a policy that is aimed at fully stabilize
consumer price inﬂation (CPI inﬂation). We also compute the endogenous response of the
monetary policy under a ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting regime.
Our main results are the following. First, an oil price shock has a contractionary eﬀect
on output. A 13% increase in the real price of oil leads to a fall in output of about 0.5%
a n da ni n c r e a s ei ni n ﬂation of about 0.4%. Second, the contractionary eﬀect of the oil shock
21is due mainly to the endogenous tightening of the monetary policy. Third, a policy that
counteracts wages rigidities delivers an aggregate real allocation that is closer to the second-
best outcome than the allocation obtained under a policy rule that targets core inﬂation
deviation from target. However, the cost of this policy is an inﬂation response to the oil
shock that is three times larger than under the last policy. Fourth, a policy rule that targets
CPI inﬂation delivers an outcome that is very close to the one obtained under core inﬂation
targeting. However, if the central bank tries to fully stabilize inﬂation there would be a
considerably decrease in output.
22Appendix
A Log-linearized model
The model is log-linearized using Taylor expansions around the steady state. In order to
simplify the model we normalize the steady state level of productivity to AH =  H
 H−1.W e
also normalize the steady state labor disutility parameter ζ so that the real wage is one.
Under these two normalizations and properly choosing the foreign currency price level of
imported goods all relative prices are one.
Let a variable in lowercase with a hat represent the log deviation with respect to the
steady state. In what follows a “real” price, denoted by b prJ,t, is the corresponding nominal
price of good J relative to the price of the consumption bundle b prJ,t = b pJ,t−b pt. Analogously,
the real wage corresponds to the nominal wage relative to the CPI, c wrt = b wt − b pt.
A.1 Aggregate Demand
We detrend and log-linearize expressions (4) and (5) to obtain the following expressions for
domestic consumption of Home and Foreign goods, and oil consumption
b cH,t =( 1− γ)(θ − η) c rert − (θ(1 − γ)+γη) b prH,t + b ct (A1)
b cF,t = −(θγ + η(1 − γ)) c rert + γ (θ − η) b prH,t + b ct (A2)
b oC,t = −η b prO,t + b ct (A3)
where c rert = b et+b p∗
F,t−b pt is the log-deviation of the real exchange rate from its steady-state
level. We are assuming that the law of one price holds for the imported good, meaning that
b pF,t = b et + b p∗
F,t,w h e r eb p∗
F,t is imported good price in foreign currency.
The optimal conditions can be combined to obtain log-linear expressions for the Euler










(b it − Etb πt+1) (A4)
b it =b i∗










. The foreign interest rate b i∗
t captures not only the relevant
interest rate in the international market but also any exogenous ﬂu c t u a t i o ni nt h er i s k
premium not captured by  b b∗
t. The process for this variable is given by
b i∗
t = ρi∗b i∗
t−1 + εi∗,t (A6)
23A.2 Aggregate Supply and Inﬂation
From the optimal price setting and the passive resetting price equation (17) we obtain the
following expression for the inﬂation of Home goods:
b πH,t =
(1 − φH)(1 − βφH)
φH(1 + βξH)
¡









The ﬁrst order condition for cost minimization problem of ﬁrms producing Home goods
determines the following relation between the quantity demanded of both inputs, labor and
oil, and their relative prices:
b oH,t −b lt = ω
¡
c wrt − b prO,t
¢
(A8)
From the production function we obtain the following log-linearized version output in
the Home goods sector:
b yH,t = b aH,t +( 1− α)b lt + αb oH,t ,( A 9 )
where the technology in the Home goods sectors evolves according to
b aH,t = ρab aH,t−1 + εa,t .( A 1 0 )
Combining the optimal choice of wages with the updating rule and the deﬁnition of the
aggregate real wages we can obtain the following log-linear expression:
1+νLφL + σL L(φL + νL)
1+σL L
c wrt − φLc wrt−1 − νLEtc wrt+1 =
(1 − νL)(1 − φL)
1+σL L
d mrst − (φL + νLξL)b πt + φLξLb πt−1 + νLEtb πt+1 +b ζt (A11)







is a preference shock –a shock to
the labor disutility parameter. We assume that this variable is stochastic and it follows
b ζt = ρζb ζt−1 + εζ,t (A12)







The marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption, d mrst,i sg i v e nb y








The real price of Home goods and the domestic currency real price of oil evolve according
to the following equations:
b prH,t = b prH,t−1 + b πH,t − b πt (A14)
b prO,t = c rert + b pr∗
O,t + b ψt (A15)
The real price of oil abroad —the relative price of oil abroad with respect to the foreign
price index— evolves according to the following expression:
b pr∗
O,t = ρo b pr∗
O,t−1 + εo,t (A16)







We assume that the variable that captures deviation of the law of one price for oil, b ψt,
follows an AR(1) process:
b ψt = ρψb ψt−1 + εψ,t (A17)
Let b π∗
t = b p∗
F,t − b p∗
F,t−1 be foreign inﬂation expressed in foreign currency. From the
deﬁnition of the real exchange rate we obtain the following expression for the evolution of
this variable:
c rert = c rert−1 + ∆b et + b π∗
t − b πt (A18)
Foreign inﬂation evolves according to the following exogenous process:
b π∗
t = ρπ∗b π∗
t−1 + επ∗,t (A19)







Finally, from the deﬁnition of the CPI and the core consumption price level we have
the following relation among the real price of oil, the real price of Home goods and the real
exchange rate:
0=δ b prO,t +( 1− δ)γ b prH,t +( 1− δ)(1 − γ) c rert (A20)
A.4 Aggregate Equilibrium
Using the log-linear expression of equations (A21) and (19) we can express the market clear








t − η∗YH − CH
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YH corresponds to the steady state fraction of Home goods that is consumed
by domestic households. From the deﬁnition of total GDP we get the following expression












Y is the consumption ratio to GDP in steady state, X
Y is total exports to GDP ratio
and M
Y is the total imports to GDP ratio.
The detrended and log-linearized expression for exports can be expressed as:















The evolution of commodity exports, b yS,t and total foreign consumption, b c∗
t, are assumed
to be determined by the following exogenous processes:
b yS,t = ρSb yS,t−1 + εS,t (A24)
b c∗
t = ρc∗b c∗
t−1 + εc∗,t (A25)
The real price index of exports is —exports deﬂator relative to the consumer price index—
is given by, b prX,t =
C∗
H
X b prH,t, where we are assuming that the real price of commodity
exports is constant, which implies that b prS,t =0 .
















The real price index of imports —imports deﬂator relative to the consumer price index—
is given by b prM,t = CF
M c rert + O
M b pr∗
O,t.
The net foreign asset position of the domestic economy evolves according to the following
expression:
(1 −  )βb b∗
t = βi∗
t + χb b∗






































where χ = 1
(1+π∗)(1+gy).
26A.5 Policy Rule
The linearized version of the baseline policy rule can be expressed as:
b rt = ρb rt−1 +( 1− ρ) πb πt +( 1− ρ) y (b yt − b yt−1)+b νt (A29)
where b rt corresponds to deviation of the real interest rate from its steady state value, deﬁned
as:
b rt =b it − Etb πt+1 (A30)
As we mentioned, we also consider an alternative rule where instead of CPI inﬂation
the central bank targets core inﬂation, b πZ,t, which can be expressed as:
b πZ,t = b πt −
δ
1 − δ
∆ b prO,t (A31)
Finally, we assume that the monetary shock is given by
b νt = ρνb νt−1 + εν,t (A32)
27B Bayesian Algorithm
In order to derive the posterior distribution of the coeﬃcients, we proceed in two steps. First,
we ﬁnd the posterior mode, which is the most likely point in the posterior distribution, and
computed the Hessian at the mode. In doing so, we use a standard optimization routine.20
In this case the likelihood function is computed by ﬁrst solving the model and then using the
Kalman ﬁlter. Second, we implement the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate draws
from the posterior. The algorithm generates a sequence of draws that is path dependent
and it works as follows:
1. Start with an initial value of the parameters, say ϑ0. Then, compute the product of
the likelihood and the prior at this point: L(ϑ0/YT)p(ϑ0).
2. From ϑ0, generate a random draw ϑ1 such that ϑ1 = ϑ0 + υ1,w h e r eυ1 follows a
multivariate normal distribution whose variance-covariance matrix is proportional to
the inverse Hessian of the likelihood function evaluated at the posterior mode. Then,
for ϑ1 compute L(ϑ1/YT)p(ϑ1).
3. The new draw ϑ1 is accepted with probability R and is rejected with (1 − R), where







If the draw is accepted, generate another draw ϑ2 = ϑ1 + υ2 as in step 2. On the
contrary, if the draw is rejected, we go back to the initial value, ϑ0, and generate
another draw. The idea of this algorithm is that, regardless of the starting value, more
draws will be accepted from the regions of the parameter space where the posterior
density is high. At the same time, areas of the posterior support with low density
are less represented, but will eventually be visited. In practice we implement this
algorithm with 5,000 draws.
B.1 Model Comparison
In order to compare alternative model speciﬁcations, we make use of the marginal likelihood
function. This is the probability that the model assigns to having observed the data. It is
deﬁned as the integral of the likelihood function across the parameter space using the prior

















is the probability of having observed the data under model speciﬁcation




and p(ϑ | Mi) are, respectively, the likelihood function and
the prior distribution under model speciﬁcation Mi. A natural way of assessing which
model is more plausible, is to construct the ratio of the marginal likelihood functions under







where Bi,j is the Bayes factor of model i over model j. A si sc l e a r ,i fBi,j > 1,m o d e li
is more plausible than model j and viceversa. Since we are unable to obtain the marginal
likelihood function in a closed-form we estimate it as in Geweke (1998) and Rabanal and
Rubio-Ramírez (2005). In particular, we integrate over the draws used to construct the
posterior distribution.
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32Table 1: Prior Densities
Param. Description Density mean/moda sd/df 90% interval
σL Inv. labor elasticity Inverse Gamma 1.00 3.00 0.64 4.89
h Habit coeﬃcient Beta 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.90
φH Price rigidity Beta 0.75 0.05 0.66 0.83
φL Wage rigidity Beta 0.75 0.05 0.66 0.83
θ H/F elast. substit. Inverse Gamma 1.00 3.00 0.64 4.89
η∗ Elast. frgn demand Inverse Gamma 1.00 3.00 0.64 4.89
  Elast. risk. premium Inverse Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.06 0.37
ξL Weight past inﬂation Beta 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.90
ξH Weight past inﬂation Beta 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.90
η core/oil elast. subst. Inverse Gamma 0.20 4.00 0.13 0.73
ω Labor/oil elasticity Inverse Gamma 0.20 4.00 0.13 0.73
ρi AR policy rule Beta 0.75 0.20 0.35 0.99
 π Inf. weight pol. rule Normal 0.75 0.15 0.50 1.00
 x Out. weight pol. rule Normal 0.50 0.15 0.25 0.75
ρa AR product. shock Beta 0.70 0.25 0.21 0.99
ρS AR exports shock Beta 0.70 0.25 0.21 0.99
ρc∗ AR frgn. cons. shock Beta 0.70 0.25 0.21 0.99
ρi∗ AR frgn int. shock Beta 0.70 0.25 0.21 0.99
ρπ∗ AR frgn. inﬂat shock Beta 0.70 0.25 0.21 0.99
ρζ AR utility shock Beta 0.70 0.25 0.21 0.99
ρψ AR oil lop shock Beta 0.70 0.25 0.21 0.99
σa s.d. product. shock Inverse Gamma 1.00 2.00 0.63 8.44
σS s.d. exports shock Inverse Gamma 1.00 2.00 0.63 8.44
σc∗ s.d. frgn. cons. shock Inverse Gamma 1.00 2.00 0.63 8.44
σi∗ s.d. frgn int. shock Inverse Gamma 0.50 2.00 0.32 4.22
σπ∗ s.d. frgn. inﬂat shock Inverse Gamma 0.25 2.00 0.16 2.11
σν s.d. monetary shock Inverse Gamma 0.20 2.00 0.13 1.69
σζ s.d. utility shock Inverse Gamma 1.00 2.00 0.63 8.44
σψ s.d. oil lop shock Inverse Gamma 1.00 2.00 0.63 8.44
For inverse gamma distribution, mode and degrees of freedom are presented
33Table 2: Posterior distributions
Param. Description Monetary Policy reacts Monetary Policy reacts
to CPI Inﬂation to core Inﬂation
mean st. Dev. mean st. Dev.
σL Inv. labor elasticity 0.781 0.141 0.959 0.102
h Habit coeﬃcient 0.324 0.104 0.254 0.040
φH Price rigidity 0.166 0.013 0.159 0.026
φL Wage rigidity 0.819 0.019 0.804 0.005
θ H/F elast. substit. 0.616 0.183 0.612 0.143
η∗ Elast. frgn demand 1.140 0.174 1.052 0.178
  Elast. risk. premium 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.001
ξL Weight past inﬂation 0.908 0.079 0.920 0.028
ξH Weight past inﬂation 0.257 0.143 0.276 0.081
η core/oil elast. subst. 0.656 0.006 0.568 0.010
ω Labor/oil elasticity 0.507 0.045 0.660 0.095
ρi AR policy rule 0.331 0.256 0.247 0.112
 pi Inf. weight pol. rule 0.850 0.032 0.835 0.028
 x Out. weight pol. rule 0.120 0.263 -0.004 0.147
ρa AR product. shock 0.936 0.017 0.931 0.032
ρS AR exports shock 0.917 0.013 0.915 0.015
ρc∗ AR frgn. cons. shock 0.887 0.021 0.865 0.013
ρi∗ AR frgn int. shock 0.991 0.027 1.000 0.000
ρπ∗ AR frgn. inﬂat shock 0.140 0.114 0.074 0.032
ρζ AR utility shock 0.521 0.198 0.480 0.143
ρψ AR oil lop shock 0.968 0.017 0.971 0.007
σa s.d. product. shock 3.019 0.224 3.146 0.103
σS s.d. exports shock 5.341 0.118 5.201 0.037
σc∗ s.d. frgn. cons. shock 4.659 0.055 4.872 0.029
σi∗ s.d. frgn int. shock 0.474 0.189 0.355 0.074
σπ∗ s.d. frgn. inﬂat shock 1.167 0.019 1.361 0.073
σν s.d. monetary shock 0.627 0.140 0.612 0.061
σζ s.d. utility shock 3.115 1.302 3.924 0.928
σψ s.d. oil lop shock 5.376 0.153 5.301 0.002
Log marginal likelihood -3049.3 -3021.9
34Figure 1: Baseline policy rule





























































































































































































































35Figure 2: Flex. prices and wages




























































































































































































































36Figure 3: Policy that undoes wages rigidity





























































































































































































































37Figure 4: CPI targeting





























































































































































































































38Figure 5: Policy that stabilizes CPI inﬂation
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